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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to §78-2a-3(2)(h),
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Did the evidence presented at the evidentiary clearly and convincingly rebut the
presumption that the Proof of Service signed by the process server and filed in this
matter is correct?

Standard of Review:
The issue presents questions of fact. An Appellate Court reviews the trial court's
Findings of Fact, with regard to clear and convincing evidence, using a clearly erroneous
standard which means, in essence, that the trial court's findings will be reversed when the
findings are "against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise
reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. "In the Interest of
J.N. et al, 960 P.2d 403 at 407 (Utah App. 1998)
When a motion to vacate a judgment is based on a claim of lack of jurisdiction the
jurisdictional determination becomes a question of law upon which the Appellate Court
does not defer to the trial court. Classic Cabinets Inc. v. All American Life Insurance
Company, 978 P.2d 465 (Ut. App. 1999).
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES AND RULES
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4(j):
If a person to be served refuses to accept a copy of the process, service shall be
sufficient if the person serving the same shall state the name of the process and offer to
deliver a copy thereof.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. NATURE OF THE CASE
1. The Complaint for Divorce was filed in this matter on March 17, 1997.
(Record, hereinafter "R" at 1) On or about May 29, 1997, a Return of Service was filed.
(R at 9) The Return of Service, signed by Gary Stubbs, certified that he had personally
served the Respondent, Claude S. Cooke, of 9642 East 7911 South, (Mile post 4.5
Highway 59) Apple Valley, Hurricane, Utah 84737 on May 28, 1997 at 9:40 A.M.
2. A Request for Default Judgment was filed by Petitioner's then counsel,
Christopher W. Edwards, on September 29, 1997. (R at 17) A copy was mailed to the
Respondent at 9642 HWY 59, 231-4, Canaan Gap, Utah 84737. (Rat 18)
3. On September 29, 1997, the Petitioner, through counsel, requested an
evidentiary hearing. (R at 15) A copy of that request was mailed to the Respondent at
9642 East 7911 South, Apple Valley, Hurricane, Utah 84737 on September 29, 1997. (R
at 16)
4. Entry of Default was signed and entered in this matter on September 30,1997.
(R at 19) A copy of that document, apparently unsigned, had been mailed to the
Respondent at 9642 Highway 59 231-4, Canaan Gap, Utah 84737 on September 29,
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1997. (R at 20) A Certificate of Default was signed and entered on September 30, 1997.
(Rat 21)
5. A Notice of Evidentiary Hearing, dated October 3, 1997 and filed in this
matter on October 6, 1997, was mailed by the Clerk of the Court to the Respondent at
9642 East 7911 South, Apple Valley, Hurricane, Utah 84737 on October 3, 1997. (R at
24)
6. A second Notice of Evidentiary Hearing, dated October 31, 1997 and filed in
this matter November 3, 1997, was mailed by the Clerk of the Court to the Respondent at
9642 East 7911 South, Apple Valley, Hurricane, Utah 84737 on October 31, 1997. R at
28) This notified the Respondent of an evidentiary hearing that would be held on
December 4, 1997. (R at 27) At the evidentiary hearing the trial court declared the
Respondent in default. The Petitioner was sworn and testified and the trial court directed
that a final order be prepared for signature and entry. (R at 29)
7. An Order Waiving Divorce Education Class for the Respondent was signed by
the trial court on January 9, 1998 and entered on January 13, 1998. (R at 34) An
apparently unsigned copy was mailed to the Respondent at 9642 East 7911 South, Apple
Valley, Hurricane, Utah 84737, on or about December 24, 1997. (R at 35)
8. The Decree of Divorce was entered in the matter on January 13, 1998. (R at
40)
9. At Petitioner's request an Order to Show Cause was issued in this matter on
March 16, 1999 which required that the Respondent appear before the Court at a time
certain to show cause why, among other things, a Judgment should not be entered against
him for child support arrears. (Rat 49-50)
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10. At the hearing on the Order to Show Cause, initially held on April 16, 1999,
Respondent's counsel moved to set aside the Default Decree of Divorce, alleging, for the
first time, defective service. (R at 54) A Motion to Set Aside Default Decree of Divorce
and Memorandum were filed with the Court on April 16, 1999. (R at 57) Petitioner filed
a timely response to that Motion, supported by the Affidavit of Gary Stubbs, in which he
provided additional detail relating to the service of the document. (R at 80-99) In that
Affidavit Mr. Stubbs indicated that he had served Respondent at a neighbor's home by
announcing his purpose, identifying the documents and offering to deliver a copy of the
documents in response to which he claims the Respondent claimed that if Mr. Stubbs
didn't touch him he wasn't served. (R at 81) Mr. Stubbs claimed that the Respondent
left the residence and Mr. Stubbs left the documents at the neighbor's home. (R at 82

11. Following an evidentiary hearing on the Respondent's Motion to Set Aside
Default Decree of Divorce, the trial court entered Findings of Fact and an Order setting
aside the Default Decree of Divorce. (R at 146) In those Findings of Fact the Court
determined, among other things that "by clear and convincing evidence . . . Respondent
was not served with the Summons and Complaint for Divorce on May 28, 1997 . . . "
12. This appeal follows.

B. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
1. With regard to the facts relating to service, the process server, Gary Stubbs,
testified the Respondent was served at approximately 9642 East 7911 South. (Transcript
of Hearing, held May 28, 1999, at page 9, hereinafter "T" at 9). However, that address
was an estimate provided by the process server since there is no address specified at the
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location where the service was completed. There is just a mile marker and a number on a
rock in the area. (T at 10,15)
2. The process server testified that he went to the Defendant's trailer in order to
effect service on May 28, 1997, but the Respondent was not there. (T at 11)
3. After the process server learned that the Respondent was not at his home, the
process server learned that the Respondent was at the home of Barbara Hall, across the
highway from the Plaintiffs home. (T at 11) The Respondent's vehicle was at the home
of Barbara Hall. Petitioner told the process server that the Respondent was at Barbara
Hall's residence. (T at 11, 32) Barbara Hall lives at 9433 E. Highway 59, Hurricane,
Utah (T at 58)
4. The process server testified that he went to Barbara Hall's home, knocked on
the door, and during a conversation with her at her front door, she informed him that the
Respondent was at her residence. (T at 12)
5. The process server testified that he then went inside the building. (T at 12) He
saw the Respondent "come out of the other side of the house in the house and [he] turned
and left going out the other door." (T at 12)
6. The process server testified that, upon seeing the Respondent, he verbally
notified him that he "had a summons for him and he could go ahead and run all he
wanted." (T at 12, 33)
7. The process server testified that he then filled out the documents he typically
fills out at the time of service. (T at 12)
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8. According to the testimony of the process server, the Respondent then came
back inside the house, on the other end of the building from where the process server
was, and engaged in a verbal conversation with the process server. (T at 12)
9. The process server testified that the Respondent then made a statement that
service had not been completed since the process server had not touched the Respondent.
(T at 13) The process server then left the documents in Barbara Hall's home after having
informed Respondent that the service was of a Complaint for Divorce. (T at 13)
10. The process server testified at the hearing that the address listed on the Return
of Service is not intended to specify the exact address of service, but instead, was an
address entered into the computer program he utilized from which the Return of Service
was printed and was intended to indicate the address of the Respondent. (T at 17-18)
11. The Return of Service indicates that the Respondent was located at "9642 E.
7911 S. (Milepost 4.5 Highway 59), Apple Valley, Hurricane, Utah 84737." (R at 9).
The Respondent testified at trial that his mailing address is 9624 E. Highway 59, Box
231-4, Canaan Gap, Utah 84737. (T at 56)
12. The Respondent testified at the hearing that he did see the process server,
Gary Stubbs, on May 28, 1997. (T at 40)
13. He testified that he was at Barbara Hall's home sitting at a table when the
process server drove up. (T at 40) He saw the process server through the front window
as the Respondent was conversing with Barbara Hall. (Tat 43)
14. The Respondent testified at the hearing that Barbara Hall had told him that
she did not know who the person was who was approaching in a vehicle at that time, (the
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process server). He also testified that Barbara Hall asked the Respondent if he knew who
the person was, and he replied, "No". (T at 44)
15. The Respondent testified that he was leaving anyway, so when he saw that
Barbara had other company coming, he left. (Tat 45)
16. At the hearing Respondent testified that he did not know that Gary Stubbs,
was the person approaching Barbara Hall's home. (T at 45) However, he did
acknowledge that he had been served by Gary Stubbs on a prior occasion. (T at 45)
17. The Respondent denied that the process server, Gary Stubbs, came into the
home, had a conversation with him, offered a copy of the Summons and Complaint, that
he refused to accept the Summons and Complaint, and denied that he heard from Gary
Stubbs, the purpose of the visit. (T at 46)
18. The Respondent acknowledged that it was possible to see Barbara Hall's
home from the Petitioner's home, as had been claimed by the process server. (T at 48,

19. The Respondent denied discussing the specific terms of the Complaint with
the Petitioner after the date he was claimed to have been served. (T at 53)
20. Barbara Hall testified at the hearing that, process server, Gary Stubbs,
arriving at her home, she and the Respondent were "chatting" in her home. (T at 59)
21. While Barbara Hall and Respondent were "chatting" they saw a car turn into
her driveway and the Respondent stated, "That looks like Gary Stubbs". (T at 60)
22. Barbara Hall later changed that testimony and said that she was not sure the
Defendant had identified Gary Stubbs (T at 71), but she still claimed that the Respondent
recognized Stubb's vehicle. (T at 72)
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23. Upon identifying the person and the vehicle approaching as looking like
"Gary Stubbs", the Respondent stated, "I'm out of here" and immediately left. (T at 61,
76)
24. Barbara Hall claimed that she came out of the home and spoke to the process
server while he was still in his car (T at 62), that the process server asked her if the
Respondent was there, and that she replied, "No. He's not." (Tat 62)
25. Barbara Hall testified that she believed that the Respondent left because he
saw the process server drive up. (T at 64) However, she later claimed that the
Respondent did not say he recognized the person driving up. (T at 64)
26. Barbara Hall testified that she invited the process server to come to her house
to see if the Respondent was there and he declined. (T at 65)
27. The Respondent testified that while she was on the porch of her home, the
process server "pushed" papers at her (T at 65) and she would not take them. (T at 65)
She claimed that the process server then threw the papers down. (T at 66) Barbara Hall
said that she then laid a block of wood on the papers and they were gone the next day. (T
at 66)
28. Barbara Hall claimed that both the Petitioner and the Respondent had a good
reputation for honesty. (T at 69 and 74)
29. The Petitioner testified that she discussed the contents of the Complaint with
the Respondent approximately two weeks after the process server delivered the
documents. (T at 89-91), including specific terms and allegations of the Complaint. (T at
91,97).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

There was substantial conflict in the testimony presented at the hearing on the
Respondent's Motion to Set Aside Default Decree of Divorce. Of substantial
significance are the inconsistencies in the testimony offered by the Respondent regarding
the events that occurred on the date the process server's return indicates service was
complete. In light of the substantial inconsistencies in the testimony offered by the
Respondent by both himself and Barbara Hall, the evidence presented did not rise to the
level of clear and convincing evidence necessary to rebut the presumption of correctness
which attaches to the proof of service filed in this matter.
ARGUMENT
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT CLEARLY AND
CONVINCINGLY REBUT THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE PROOF OF SERVICE
FILED IN THIS MATTER WAS CORRECT.
A. The return of service in this matter is entitled to the same presumption of
correctness which attaches to a sheriffs return of service.
In Carries v. Carries, 668 P.2d 555 (Utah 1983) the Supreme Court of the State of
Utah acknowledged that "a sheriffs return of service of process is presumptively correct
and is prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein . . . " Id. at 557 The Court went on
to state that "the invalidity or absence of service of process" needs to be shown by "clear
and convincing evidence." Id.
In Classic Cabinets Inc. v. All American Life Insurance Co., 978 P.2d 465 (Utah
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App. 1999) the Utah Court of Appeals declined to afford a constable's return of service
any less of a presumption of correctness. In that case the party challenging the validity of
service argued that, "because a constable, rather than a sheriff, effectuated service,... the
presumption [of correctness] did not apply." Id. at 468 The Court rejected the argument
that "because a mere constable . . . earns his livelihood from the collection of service fees
. . . and therefore has an inherent conflict of interest in any dispute over service" the
presumption was not applicable. Id. at 468 The Court refused to "indulge the
proposition that a constable would deliberately falsify a return and related affidavits to
protect a service fee." Id. at 468
In Classic Cabinets the Court concluded that "a constable's return of service is
entitled to the same deference as a sheriffs" and that "a constable's Affidavit of Service
is prima facie evidence of proper service of process and is deemed presumptively
correct." Id at 468
At the evidentiary hearing in this matter the parties conceded that, in order to
vacate service, the Respondent would need to prove that service had not been completed
consistent with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and that the standard of proof was by
clear and convincing evidence. (Tat 111)
Just as constable's return of service is presumptively correct, in light of the
absurdity in suggesting that a constable would deliberately falsify a return and related
affidavits in order to protect a service fee, the return of service in this case, signed by Mr.
Gary Stubbs who has served numerous documents over the years, is presumptively
correct. That presumption of correctness shifts the burden of proof to the Respondent,
the party attacking the validity of service, to prove, by clear and convincing evidence,
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that service was not completed as established in the Proof of Service, completed by Mr.
Stubbs on May 29, 1997, sworn to on that date and filed with the trial court. (R at 9)
B. The presumption of correctness was not rebutted by clear and convincing
evidence, as required by the law in this state.
Determining the credibility of witnesses is normally a factor reserved for the trier
of fact. For that reason, a party attacking the trial court's factual findings under the
preponderance of the evidence standard must marshal the evidence in support of the
challenged finding and then demonstrate that the evidence does not support the finding
reached. The procedure in reviewing a finding under the clear and convincing evidence
standard is different.
In In the Interest of J.N. et al9 960 P.2d 403 (Utah App. 1998) the Court
acknowledged that, in reviewing a factual finding under the clear and convincing
standard, the appellate court may reverse the finding if it "reaches a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made,. . ." Id. at 407 While this does not permit the
appellate court to simply ignore the trial court's findings, it does require the appellate
court to review the evidence in order to determine whether a mistake has been made.
In this matter the most significant discrepancy between the testimony offered by
the witnesses involved the events that occurred from the time the process server
approached Barbara Hall's home until he left.
Mr. Stubbs, the process server, was certain that he had spoken with the
Respondent, had informed the Respondent of the documents being served, and left the
documents at the location of service, consistent with Rule 4(j) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
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Barbara Hall and the Respondent testified that Mr. Stubbs had not personally
contacted the Respondent. While, at first blush, it might appear that the consistency of
their testimony on that issue "clearly and convincingly" rebuts the presumptive
correctness of the sworn Proof of Service, certain details of their testimony, which are
substantially inconsistent, provide "definite and firm" support for a finding that such is
not the case.
Barbara Hall testified that she and the Respondent had a specific conversation
when Mr. Stubbs vehicle was seen approaching in which they discussed the identity of
the person who was approaching her home. (T at 60) She volunteered that information
without any prodding or suggestion as to the answer Respondent's counsel expected her
to give. She went on to say that, as soon as Respondent identified the person who was
approaching the home, Respondent said, "I'm out of here . . . " (T at 61) and he left. (T at
63)
Later in her testimony, after acknowledging that Respondent had recognized Mr.
Stubbs, Ms. Hall testified that she felt that Respondent had left because he saw Mr.
Stubbs driving up. (T at 64) A compound question by the trial court elicited an
ambiguous response and a leading question resulted in her agreement that Respondent
had left because he saw a "car coming." (See T at 64, lines 10-22) Although the witness
attempted to retreat from her first statement that the Respondent had recognized the
process server and was "out of here," her initial statement is critical in assessing the
credibility of Ms. Hall and of the Respondent.
Respondent attempted to give the impression that he simply left when the process
server arrived because he saw that Barbara Hall was receiving another visitor. He even
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testified that they discussed who the visitor might be and neither could identify the
person, in absolute conflict with the testimony offered by Barbara Hall on that subject.
(T at 44) One of them was not telling the truth.
The discrepancy regarding discussions between Ms. Hall and the Respondent
regarding the identity of the person approaching Ms. Hall's home on the morning of May
29, 1997 is not so critical because of what occurred, even though Respondent's obvious
attempt to avoid being "touched" because he believed that he could thereby avoid service
of process should not be countenanced in any regard. The discrepancy is more
significantly relevant in demonstrating that the witnesses, Ms. Hall and the Respondent,
were not being truthful.
The Proof of Service completed and signed by Gary Stubbs, under oath, is
presumptively correct. Service should be set aside only if that presumption is rebutted
by clear and convincing evidence. In light of the discrepancy between the testimony
offered by the two witnesses who testified in an effort to rebut that presumption, the
evidence is not clear and convincing. If their testimony is to be believed, the picture is
even more blurred.
In addition to receiving service of the Summons and Complaint, consistent with
Rule 4(j) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Respondent received notice of additional
proceedings in the matter, including the Respondent's Motion for Default Judgment,
Request for an Evidentiary Hearing and Request and Notice of Evidentiary Hearing. He
knew the proceedings were pending. He discussed specific terms of the Complaint with
the Petitioner and with her counsel. (See R at 15, Petitioner's Request for Evidentiary
Hearing, in which it is alleged that the Petitioner's prior counsel had had contact with the

13

Respondent on a few occasions.) The Respondent simply waited until Petitioner sought
to enforce the terms of the Decree (See R at 47, the Petitioner's Motion for Order to
Show Cause) and he then sought to avoid the entire proceedings, apparently because he
intended to claim that, because he had not been touched (T at 13) he had not been served.
As this Court is well aware, touching is not required to serve process. Rule 4(j) provides
for service in situations like this where the party being served refuses to receive the
process.
The presumptive correctness of the Proof of Service signed by Mr. Stubbs under
oath has not been rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court's Order
Setting Aside Default Decree of Divorce, entered on July 28, 1999, should be reversed
and the original Decree of Divorce, entered on January 13, 1998, reinstated.
CONCLUSION
The Respondent did not, by clear and convincing evidence, rebut the presumption
of correctness which attaches to the Proof of Service filed in this matter. The trial court's
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Order should be reversed and the original Decree of Divorce reinstated.
DATED this
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. 2000.

G/ftlicnae/
/Of and
GALIMN, WESTFALL, WILCOX & WRIGHT

I, G. Michael Westfall, certify that on the
day of
_, 2000,
I served two copies of the above Brief of Appellant upon Lewis P. Re66e, counsel for the
Appellee in this matter, by mailing it to him by first class mail with^fficient postage
prepaid to the following address:
Lewis P. Reece
SNOW & JENSEN
134 North 200 East, #302
St. George, Utah 84770

fadJ, Attorney for Appe
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Section I
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SECTION I

I Process Services

: r . i ; . i S T R ! C T CO'UKi
Court Case Number:
rfj$£lp£xl^3

Q7 fH^V 29

Box 603
i n g t o n , Utah 84780
n t I n f o : GHERRI
COOKE v s

CLAUDE

S.

COOKE

if! 1 ^ i
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I Served: CLAUDE S. COOKE
nv
Located at: 9642 EAST 7911 SOUTH (MILE POST 4.5 HWY. 59)
APPLE VALLEY, HURRICANE, UTAH 84737
On the: 28 th
day of: MAY
1997
t the hour of: 0800 A.M.
(Mountain Standard Time)
ments Served >
} Small Claims Affidavit and Order
(:
) Summons and Complaint
) Summons, Complaint, ADR packet and/or OPT out statement.
} Supplemental Proceedings (Judgement Debtor Hearing)
) Writ of Continuing Garnishment (Wage)
(:
) Garnishee Order
} Writ of Garnishment (Non-Wage) (:
) Writ of Garnishment (std. time)
) Order to Show Cause (:
) Subpoena:
M) Summons, Complaint,: ADR PACKET. DIVORCE EDUCATION FOR PARENTS NOTICE.
):

er of Service Completed;
i) Personally Served: CLAUDE

S, COOKE

) At the dwelling, house or usual place of abode, with some person of
able age and discretion there residing.Being:
) By delivering a copy to an agent authorized or by appointment or by law
BCeive process.Being:
) By POSTING in a conspicuous manner. (Upon the main entry point)
5/26/97 0940 AM

2: 05/28/97 0800 AM/SERVED
4:

at Information: GHERRI COOKE vs
M* D. BOYACK, ESQ. ATP. (801-628-2676)
ag been duly sworn, I hereby depose and say that I am a citizen of the
ad States, a resident of State of Utah,: 46 years of age at the time of
Lee and not a party to or interested in this action. That at the time of
Lee I did endorse upon the copy left for the person to be served, the date
which same was served and did endorse my name thereto in accordance
the Utah Judicial Code.
Dated this: 29 th day of: MAY

ZRIBED & SWORN before me this: 29 th day of: MAY

Lee Fees
*r of Attempts : 2
*r of Miles
:
ige Fee
$: 48
* Base Fee
$ 6.00
or Locate Fee $:
[. SERVICE FEE $: 54.00

q

j
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

GHERRI COOKE,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
ORDER SETTING ASIDE
DEFAULT DECREE OF
DIVORCE

Petitioner,
v.

Civil No. 974500183

CLAUDE SETH COOKE,

Judge G. Rand Beacham

Respondent.

This matter came before the Court on May 28,1999, pursuant to Respondent's Motion to
Set Aside Default Decree of Divorce. Petitioner was present and represented by counsel, Jeffrey
D. Bursell, of the law office of Hughes & Associates. Respondent was present and represented by
counsel, Lewis P. Reece of the law office of Snow & Jensen, P.C. Having reviewed the parties'
briefs and oral arguments, and having heard the testimony presented at the hearing, the Court
hereby enters the following findings and order.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1•

The issue before this Court focuses on whether Respondent was served with a copy

of the Summons and Complaint on May 28,1997, as shown by the Proof of Service filed with this
Court on May 29, 1997. The Court finds that under Garcia v. Garcia, 111 P.2d 288 (Utah 1986),
Respondent must be served pursuant to Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; otherwise this
Court lacks jurisdiction over the Respondent, and the January 13, 1998 Decree of Divorce is void.
2.

This Court further finds that Respondent waived all other theories for setting aside

CC.2.FF ORDER2/403401/sr

the Decree of Divorce at the hearing in this matter that were pursued in his Memorandum
Supporting his Motion to Set Aside Default Decree of Divorce, except for the lack of jurisdiction
theory on the basis of no service of process under Utah R... Civ. P. 4. fais
titisrCuml cigiicu with Llij
cuaiidum >sujJporti
wirient, however ^ rrplninrri in Pnint T nf fhr Mi mmvii'iilnni
iii|i\inifinr hh Motion, fhnt
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3.

At the May 28,1999 hearing, Mr. Gary Stubbs testified regarding Respondent's

refusal to accept service. Petitioner's theory was that service was effected pursuant to Utah R.
Civ. P. 4(j), arguing that Respondent refused to accept service. The Court finds, however, that
there were discrepancies between the facts testified to by Mr. Stubbs and the facts stated on Mr.
Stubbs' Proof of Service. Similar discrepancies existed in Mr. Stubbs' subsequent Proof of
Service on the order to Show Cause, which order resulted in Respondent's Motion to Set Aside.
Specifically, Mr. Stubbs admitted on the stand that Respondent was not served at the location of
service shown in the proofs of service that were referred to as Exhibits 1 and 2 at the May 28,
£p>

1999 hearing. The accuracy of these proofs of service:»e a concern to this Court.
4.

The Court is not convinced that Mr. Stubbs has an.independent recollection of the

facts surrounding service of Respondent on May 28, 1997. Mr. Stubbs has no particularly strong
motive to testify falsely in this matter, and the Court does not find that Mr. Gary Stubbs testified
falsely, knowingly. The Court notes as testified by Mr. Stubbs, that he performs several thousand
services each year and that several thousand services were performed by Mr. Stubbs from the time
of the purported service of the Complaint for Divorce and his testimony at the hearing in this
matter.
5.

Respondent Claude Seth Cooke testified from independent recollection that he was

not served and did not speak with Mr. Gary Stubbs. Respondent's testimony directly contradicted
Mr. Stubbs' testimony. Respondent does have some motive to fabricate evidence, but such is
simply an assumption based upon Respondent's position in the lawsuit. It is not to be inferred
from his testimony at the May 28,1999 hearing.
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6.

Ms. Barbara Hall testified from independent recollection that Respondent was not

served and that Mr. Gary Stubbs did not go into her home and did not speak with Respondent.
Ms. Hall's testimony corroborated the testimony of Respondent in all material respects. Ms. Hall
is a friend of both Petitioner and Respondent. The Court finds that Ms. Hall has no obvious
motive to testify against either party, but only to tell the truth.
7.

This Court concludes that Ms. Barbara Hall was the most objective witness which

appeared and testified in this matter. Her testimony is the most credible.
8.

The Court is satisfied that the testimony of Respondent, along with the corrobative

testimony of Ms. Barbara Hall, is clear enough to meet the moving parties' burden of proof. The
Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent was not served with the Summons
and Complaint for Divorce on May 28,1997, as stated in the Proof of Service or as required by
Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
9.

Respondent has filed an Answer and Counterclaim which asserts a meritorious

defense meeting the common law requirements of Rule 60(b), in that it is sufficient to raise issues
that need to be resolved in this case.
10.

It is reasonable and proper that Respondent's Motion to Set Aside Default Decree of

Divorce be granted and that the Decree of Divorce, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and
the Entry of Default, which have been filed in this matter, be set aside and vacated.
11.

It is reasonable and proper, that service of Petitioner's initial Complaint be effected

by mailing the same to the Respondent's counsel, who shall accept service in behalf of
Respondent.
ORDER
Having entered the above Findings of Fact, and finding good cause therefor,
n IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

Respondent's Motion to Set Aside Decree of Divorce is granted.
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2.

The January 13,1998 Decree of Divorce entered in this matter is vacated and set

3.

The January 13,1998 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered in this

aside.

matter are vacated.
4.

The September 30,1997 Entry of Default entered in this matter is vacated.

5.

Service of Petitioner's initial Complaint and Respondent's Answer and

Counterclaim shall be effected by mailing the same to the opposing party's counsel, who shall
accept service on behalf of Respondent.
DATED this rTl

day of £aae( 1999
FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
Judge G. Rand Beacham
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

On this JO

day of June, 1999,1 caused a true and correct copy of the unsigned

FINDINGS OF FACT AND ORDER SETTING ASIDE DEFAULT DECREE OF DIVORCE to
be mailed, U.S. mail, first class, postage pre-paid to the following:
Jeffrey D. Bursell, Esq.
HUGHES & ASSOCIATES

187 North 100 West
St. George, UT 84770
^-^Secretary
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